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Introduction
The jurisdiction of Indian1 tribal courts is undergoing a substantial
expansion in the twenty-first century.2 Both Congress3 and the Supreme Court4
have recently reaffirmed the inherent jurisdiction of Indian tribes, and
encouraged the expansion of tribal powers to redress the failure of state and
federal law enforcement to keep reservation communities safe.5 This is a
marked reversal of federal policy, which had previously worked to circumvent
tribal jurisdiction6 by handing law enforcement responsibility on Indian
lands to the states.7
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1. The word “Indian” is a legal term of art and is regularly used in the law and by lawyers
to describe many of America’s indigenous people. The term is used to codify the definition of
‘Indian Country’ at 18 USC § 1151 and is used to determine which tribes share in a governmentto-government relationship through the Federally Recognized Indian Tribes List Act of 1994, Pub.
L. 103–454, 108 Stat. 4791 (1994). But for a discussion of how the term ‘Indian’ is more
problematic in an international context see H.P. GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD, 60 at
n.1 (Oxford University Press, 5th ed., 2014).
2. See Matthew L. M. Fletcher, A Unifying Theory of Tribal Civil Jurisdiction, 46 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 779 (2014) [hereinafter Fletcher, A Unifying Theory of Tribal Civil Jurisdiction]; Grant
Christensen, Creating Bright-Line Rules for Tribal Court Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians: The Case
of Trespass to Real Property, 35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 527 (2011); Bethany Berger, Justice and the
Outsider: Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047 (2005);
Melissa Tatum, A Jurisdictional Quandary: Challenges Facing Tribal Governments in Implementing
the Full Faith and Credit Provisions of the Violence Against Women Acts, 90 KY. L.J. 123 (2002).
3. Congress expanded tribal court criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in the Violence
Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (2013), and expanded
the criminal penalties tribal courts may impose through the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258 (2010).
4. The Supreme Court has expanded tribal court jurisdiction over time. In Duro v. Reina,
495 U.S. 676 (1990), the Court ruled that the inherent criminal jurisdiction of Indian tribes was
limited only to their members. However, by 2004, the Court reversed, holding that tribes possess
inherent criminal jurisdiction over all Indian persons whether or not they are members of the tribe.
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). The Court also clarified that tribal court convictions,
obtained after proceedings that meet all required tribal court procedures, can be used as predicate
offenses for purposes of expanded federal or state criminal jurisdiction. United States v. Bryant,
136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016).
5. For a pertinent example, Justice Ginsburg provides some excellent insight on the
problems of domestic violence which have become endemic in Indian Country. “‘[C]ompared to
all other groups in the United States,’ Native American women ‘experience the highest rates of
domestic violence.’” 151 CONG. REC. 9061 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 2005) (statement of Sen. McCain).
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, as many as 46% of American Indian
and Alaska Native women have been victims of physical violence by an intimate partner. CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL,
NAT’L INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY 2010 SUMMARY REPORT (2011).
6. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (An activists Supreme Court
determined that tribes lack the inherent criminal jurisdiction to prosecute non-Indian defendants).
7. For a discussion of the largest federally approved state-expansion of jurisdiction in Indian
Country, see Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the Twenty-First
Century? Some Data at Last, 38 CONN. L. REV. 697 (2006); Robert Anderson, Negotiating
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Jurisdiction: Retroceding State Authority over Indian Country Granted by Public Law 280, 87
WASH. L. REV. 915 (2012).
8. Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 849 (6th Cir. 2016).
9. Id.
10. Id., reh’g denied, No. 14-1537, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 3407 (6th Cir., Feb. 8, 2016).
11. Id., cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 183 (2016).
12. 809 F.3d at 849.
13. Id. at 861 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981)).
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In keeping with these trends, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has
responded to signals from Congress and the Supreme Court by affirming
even the extraterritorial reach of tribal court criminal jurisdiction over tribal
members.8 In Kelsey v. Pope, the Sixth Circuit unanimously recognized the
ability of tribal courts to determine the extent of their own criminal
jurisdiction even when the asserted criminal authority extended to member
conduct outside the reservation.9 The Sixth Circuit’s decision overcame a
request for a rehearing en banc10 and a failed petition for certiorari at the
Supreme Court.11 It is now firmly established as the law of the Sixth Circuit
and is likely to pave the way as other circuit courts confront similar
jurisdictional questions.
This article takes the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Kelsey v. Pope12 and
argues that the principle of tribal court extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction
should extend beyond the limited facts of the case to encompass inherent
criminal jurisdiction over all land owned by the tribe regardless of
reservation status, and over all conduct of tribal members whenever that
conduct has a reasonable connection to the tribe. Moreover, the Sixth
Circuit’s implied limitation that the assertion of criminal jurisdiction must
be necessary to “protect tribal self-government or to control internal
relations”13 should not be retained by future federal courts reviewing the
limits of a tribe’s inherent criminal powers because such limitations are
properly applied only to civil causes of action.
This article explores the implications of Kelsey v. Pope, and its logical
legal extensions, to justify a broadening of extraterritorial tribal court
criminal authority. Part I puts the case in context by chronicling the
development of criminal jurisdiction in a world of competing sovereigns: the
tribe, the state, and the United States. Part II examines the Kelsey opinion in
detail, reviewing both the general proposition that tribal sovereignty includes
the inherent authority of tribes to assert their criminal jurisdiction outside of
their territory, and the Sixth Circuit’s rejection of the defendant’s argument
that extraterritorial criminal powers have been implicitly divested as
inconsistent with a tribe’s sovereign status. Part III argues that the principles
of tribal court criminal jurisdiction should extend to all land owned or
controlled by a tribe, and should not be limited by a nexus to tribal
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government interests. Finally, the article ends with a few brief concluding
remarks on the future implications of the Sixth Circuit’s decision.

I. Criminal Jurisdiction Basics
While the question of whether inherent tribal court criminal jurisdiction
over tribal members exists on tribal lands outside the reservation was an issue
of first impression among federal circuit courts, the Sixth Circuit’s decision
in Kelsey v. Pope was based on almost two centuries of Indigenous history14
and Supreme Court jurisprudence.15 The Court in Kelsey placed particular
emphasis on judicial precedents involving questions of inherent tribal
powers in other contexts, like sovereign immunity and civil jurisdiction, in
order to conclude that a tribe’s inherent power may extend beyond the
boundaries of the reservation..16
The Supreme Court has confronted questions of criminal jurisdiction in
Indian Country from its founding. Early cases focused on the power of state
or federal courts to assert criminal jurisdiction over activity occurring on
tribal lands. As early as 1832, Chief Justice John Marshall held that the state
of Georgia could not enforce its criminal laws upon lands held by the
Cherokee Nation because states lacked criminal jurisdiction over Indians in
Indian Country.17 In 1881, the Court clarified the metes of criminal
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14. Neyooxet Greymorning, The Anglocentric Supremacy of the Marshall Court, 10 ALB.
GOV’T L. REV. 191, 198–99 (2017) (“Where the force of British rule could not be exerted, Indian
people were left to govern themselves in accordance to their own laws, as customs dictated. This
was classically demonstrated in 1736, when the British colonial government of South Carolina sent
a commissioner to arrest Gottlieb Priber, a Jesuit Priest who had been living among the Cherokee
and working for French interests. The commissioner, and the military personnel who accompanied
him, were forced to return to South Carolina under Cherokee escort. As long as Priber remained
within Cherokee territory all the ‘lawful’ demands of the English were of no consequence.”).
15. In the 1830s, the Supreme Court held that Georgia lacked criminal jurisdiction over
Indian country, because the tribe had the exclusive power within its borders. Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. 515, 562 (1832). In Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), the Court held that the
United States lacked criminal jurisdiction over Indians committing crimes on tribal lands.
16. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832) (“The Indian nations had always been
considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as
the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial.”); United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S.
614, 617 (1876) (“The tribes for whom the act of 1834 was made were those semi-independent
tribes whom our government has always recognized as exempt from our laws, whether within or
without the limits of an organized State or Territory, and, in regard to their domestic government,
left to their own rules and traditions.”); Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 559 (“If the land reserved
for the exclusive occupancy of Indians lies outside the exterior boundaries of any organized
Territorial government, it would require an act of Congress to attach it to a judicial district.”).
17. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 562 (Georgia had enacted a law making unlawful to live within the
limits of the Cherokee Nation without a license. Samuel Worcester and Elizur Butler, Vermont
missionaries, were prosecuted under the law, convicted, and incarcerated. Their appeal reached the
Supreme Court which held that states lack jurisdiction for activities that occur on Indian lands. “It
is the opinion of this court that the judgment of the superior court for the county of Gwinnett, in
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jurisdiction by articulating an exception: States have limited criminal
jurisdiction over criminal activity occurring in Indian Country when both the
perpetrator and the victim are non-Indian.18 In 1883, the Court unanimously
held that when Crow Dog, a member of the Brule Sioux Band of Sioux
Indians, killed fellow tribal member Sin-ta-ge-le-Scka, the United States
lacked criminal jurisdiction over the offense because there was no treaty nor
act of Congress conferring authority over criminal conduct occurring
between tribal members on Indian lands.19 In response, Congress enacted a
federal law granting the United States power to assert criminal jurisdiction
over Indians in Indian Country,20 and the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the congressional action just three years later.21
The development of Supreme Court precedent on tribal court
jurisdiction took slightly longer, in part because tribes did not traditionally
have ‘courts’ as the common law envisions them.22 Although in 1896 the
Supreme Court held that tribal courts did not have to operate using criminal
procedures identical to those used in state courts, in part because tribal courts
are not subject to the Constitution nor required to give defendants rights
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the state of Georgia, condemning Samuel A. Worcester to hard labour, in the penitentiary of the
state of Georgia, for four years, was pronounced by that court under colour of a law which is void,
as being repugnant to the constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States, and ought, therefore,
to be reversed and annulled.”).
18. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881) (“The State of Colorado, by its
admission into the Union by Congress, upon an equal footing with the original States in all respects
whatever, without any such exception as had been made in the treaty with the Ute Indians and in
the act establishing a territorial government, has acquired criminal jurisdiction over its own citizens
and other white persons throughout the whole of the territory within its limits, including the Ute
Reservation, and that reservation is no longer within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States.”).
19. Ex Parte Crow Dog, 105 U.S. at 572 (“To give to the clauses in the treaty of 1868 and
the agreement of 1877 effect, so as to uphold the jurisdiction exercised in this case, would be to
reverse in this instance the general policy of the government towards the Indians, as declared in
many statutes and treaties, and recognized in many decisions of this court, from the beginning to
the present time. To justify such a departure, in such a case, requires a clear expression of the
intention of Congress, and that we have not been able to find.”).
20. The Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2013). See also Christopher B. Chaney, The
Effect of the United States Supreme Court’s Decisions During the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth
Century on Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction, 14 BYU J. PUB. L. 173 (2000).
21. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (“The power of the general
government over [Indians] is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among
whom they dwell.”).
22. Barbara A. Atwood, Tribal Jurisprudence and Cultural Meanings of the Family, 79 NEB.
L. REV. 577, 585 (2000) (“Tribal courts, as we know them today, are a modern invention often
bearing a greater superficial resemblance to Anglo-American courts operating outside Indian
country than to the judicial systems that operated within tribes historically. Although justice
systems existed within tribes in pre-colonial times, much of what has been written about such
systems is anthropological speculation.”).
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identical to those enumerated in the Bill of Rights,23 it was not until 1978
that the Supreme Court addressed tribal court criminal jurisdiction directly.
In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Court determined that tribal
courts lacked criminal jurisdiction over all non-Indians.24 The Court
reasoned that, although Congress had never explicitly limited tribal criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians, the power was implicitly divested because it
was inconsistent with the status of tribes as sovereign entities ‘dependent’
upon the United States.25 Twelve years later, in Duro v. Reina,26 the Court
clarified that tribal courts retain criminal jurisdiction only over members of
their tribe, and not against any non-member Indian, without an express
authorization from Congress.
More recently the Supreme Court has expanded the criminal
jurisdiction of tribal courts and manifested its support for their procedures.
In United States v. Lara,27 the Court deferred to Congress and essentially
reversed the decision in Duro––thereby affirming the inherent power of
tribal courts to assert criminal jurisdiction over all Indians regardless of their
tribe.28 In United States v. Bryant,29 the Court held that criminal convictions
in tribal court, even if uncounseled, could be used as predicate offenses in
the context of federal criminal law. While the tribal court’s criminal
procedures did not need to be identical to those afforded under the

40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 9 Side B
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23. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (“[T]he existence of the right in Congress to
regulate the manner in which the local powers of the Cherokee Nation shall be exercised does not
render such local powers federal powers arising from and created by the Constitution of the United
States. It follows that as the powers of local self-government enjoyed by the Cherokee Nation
existed prior to the Constitution, they are not operated upon by the Fifth Amendment, which, as we
have said, had for its sole object to control the powers conferred by the Constitution on the national
government.”).
24. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (“Indian tribes do not have
inherent jurisdiction to try and to punish non-Indians.”).
25. Id. at 199. (“[T]ribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, is inter alia, inconsistent with
treaty provisions recognizing the sovereignty of the United States over the territory assigned to the
Indian nation and the dependence of the Indians on the United States.”).
26. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 695–96 (1990) (“The contacts approach is little more than
a variation of the argument that any person who enters an Indian community should be deemed to
have given implied consent to tribal criminal jurisdiction over him. We have rejected this approach
for non-Indians. It is a logical consequence of that decision that nonmembers, who share relevant
jurisdictional characteristics of non-Indians, should share the same jurisdictional status.”).
27. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
28. Lara, 541 U.S. at 210 (“[T]he Constitution authorizes Congress to permit tribes, as an
exercise of their inherent tribal authority, to prosecute nonmember Indians. We hold that Congress
exercised that authority in writing this statute. That being so, the Spirit Lake Tribe’s prosecution
of Lara did not amount to an exercise of federal power, and the Tribe acted in its capacity of a
separate sovereign. Consequently, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the Federal
Government from proceeding with the present prosecution for a discrete federal offense.”).
29. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016).
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Constitution, tribal court proceedings must meet all other federal procedural
requirements in order to be used as a predicate offense.30
Against this background, the Sixth Circuit recently determined whether
a tribal court could assert criminal jurisdiction over a member of its tribe
when the criminal conduct occurred outside the tribe’s reservation lands, but
on territory nonetheless owned by the tribe. This case squarely placed the
role of both tribal membership and tribal land in the construction of tribal
court criminal jurisdiction before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

II. The Sixth Circuit and Kelsey v. Pope
In 2016 the Sixth Circuit answered a question that was essentially a
matter of first impression in any federal circuit, but built upon decades of
federal jurisprudence regarding the scope and extent of tribal court criminal
jurisdiction. In Kelsey v. Pope the defendant, Norbert Kelsey, was convicted
in the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Court of misdemeanor
sexual assault occurring at the Band’s community center.31 At the time of
the assault Kelsey was an elected member of the Band’s nine-person Tribal
Council.32 The victim was a tribal employee, although an enrolled member
of a neighboring tribe.33
While the community center was owned by the Tribe and was located
across the street from land that was part of the Tribe’s reservation, the
community center itself was not held in trust by the United States and was
therefore not “Indian Country.”34 If the community center had been a part
of the reservation, no jurisdictional question would have been raised because
tribes have the inherent power to criminally prosecute their own members
for criminal activity committed on their lands.35 Kelsey challenged the tribal
40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 10 Side A
12/07/2018 13:09:16

30. Id. at 1966 (“Because Bryant’s tribal-court convictions occurred in proceedings that
complied with ICRA and were therefore valid when entered, use of those convictions as predicate
offenses in a § 117(a) prosecution does not violate the Constitution.”).
31. Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 849, 852 (6th Cir. 2016).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 853.
34. Id. (“The Community Center, located just across the street from the reservation, is
constructed on land purchased by the Band in fee simple in 1997 but is not within ‘Indian country’
as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151.”). For additional discussion of Indian country see Katherine J.
Florey, Indian Country’s Borders: Territoriality, Immunity, and the Construction of Tribal
Sovereignty, 51 B.C. L. REV. 595 (2010); Kristen A. Carpenter, Interpreting Indian Country in
State of Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 35 TULSA L.J. 73 (1999); Kevin K. Washburn,
American Indians, Crime, and Law: Five Years of Scholarship on Criminal Justice in Indian
Country, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1003 (2008).
35. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 204 (2004) (“[T]he power to prosecute a tribe’s
own members—a power that this Court has called ‘inherent.’ In large part it concerns a tribe’s
authority to control events that occur upon the tribe’s own land.”) (quoting United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322–23 (1978)). See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)

40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 10 Side B

12/07/2018 13:09:16

CHRISTENSEN_FINAL TO PRINTER 11.18.18 (DO NOT DELETE)

300

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

11/18/2018 4:19 PM

[Vol. 46:2

court’s jurisdiction, arguing that the Band’s criminal jurisdiction is coextensive with its reservation boundaries, and it therefore lacked jurisdiction
over any criminal activity that may have occurred at the community center.36
The tribal court held that its jurisdiction extended over Kelsey’s conduct at
the community center, and the tribe’s appellate court affirmed.37
Kelsey filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Michigan, arguing that the Band’s
inherent criminal jurisdiction did not extend outside of Indian country.38 The
district court granted Kelsey’s habeas petition; holding that the inherent
power of Indian tribes to assert criminal jurisdiction outside of Indian
country, even over their own members, had been implicitly divested by
virtue of the tribe’s dependent status.39 The tribe appealed the decision to
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

A. Inherent Criminal Jurisdiction Outside the Reservation
The Sixth Circuit began its opinion by rejecting the district court’s
conclusion that the inherent criminal jurisdiction, manifest by tribal
sovereignty, stops at the reservation’s borders. Speaking for the Sixth Circuit
Majority, Judge McKeague reasoned that Indian tribes’ sovereignty
“preexisted the founding; it is neither derived from nor protected by the
Constitution.”40 The court recognized the uniqueness of federal Indian law;
Indians retain the inherent powers that they have always possessed by virtue
of their sovereignty, but those inherent powers are subject to complete
defeasance by Congress’ plenary power.41
The Sixth Circuit took its guidance from the Supreme Court, which has
placed a tribe’s power to punish its own members among the “inherent”
40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 10 Side B
12/07/2018 13:09:16

(“Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their
members and their territory.”).
36. Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 853.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 853–54.
39. Id. at 854. See also Kelsey v. Pope, No. 14-1537, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43037 at *5
(W.D. Mich., Mar. 31, 2014) (“The Court’s statement that tribes retain sovereignty over ‘both their
members and their territory,’ does not mean that a tribe’s jurisdiction over its members is without
bounds . . . The statement suggests that tribal membership and territory are connected, and that
tribes retain sovereignty where both are present.”) (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323).
40. Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 855 (quoting Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Little River Band of Ottawa
Indians Tribal Gov’t, 788 F.3d 537, 544 (6th Cir. 2015)).
41. Id. (“Congress wields power ‘consistently described as plenary and exclusive to legislate
[with] respect to Indian tribes.’” (citing Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030
(2014)). This idea has formed the basis of federal Indian from the beginning. See Philip P. Frickey,
Marshalling Past and Present: Colonization, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal
Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381 (1993).
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powers all tribes possessed since time immemorial.42 However, the Supreme
Court had never encountered a situation where the tribe was asserting its
inherent criminal powers over alleged illegal activity occurring outside of
Indian Country. While the Tribe argued that its inherent powers extended to
the activities of its members wherever that activity would substantially affect
the tribe’s interest in self-government, Kelsey averred that the tribe’s
inherent power is coterminous with Indian Country and cannot exist outside
the reservation absent congressional direction.43
The court was ultimately persuaded by the tribe’s argument that a
tribe’s inherent criminal jurisdiction extends over its members whenever
their conduct would substantially affect tribal self-government. It found
support for this proposition in a line of Supreme Court precedent that
contradistinguishes the power of tribal courts over “their members and their
territory.”44 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that not only has the Supreme Court
treated membership and territory as an alternative instead of complementary
basis for jurisdiction, but it has also explained that by virtue of their tribal
membership, tribal members have consented to the authority of the tribe.45
While the Sixth Circuit recognized that Duro and Wheeler emerged from onreservation disputes, the court expanded their principles to recognize that the

42.
43.

40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 11 Side A
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Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 855 (citing United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 204 (2004)).
The question pertinent to Kelsey’s case, however, is whether this inherent
authority to prosecute members extends beyond reservation boundaries. The
parties advance two competing theories as to how tribal criminal jurisdiction
operates. To the Band, the tribes have ‘inherent authority to prosecute tribal
members for offenses substantially affecting [tribal] self-governance interests,’
even when such offenses take place outside of Indian country. Kelsey rejects
this membership-based jurisdiction, arguing that sovereign authority (and thus
criminal jurisdiction) is defined by the twin factors of tribal membership and
territory—when either factor is absent, the tribe’s inherent authority, in this case
criminal jurisdiction, is greatly diminished or altogether absent. Though our
governing precedent has not specifically addressed this question, the Band’s
theory of membership-based jurisdiction is more persuasive.
Id. at 855–56.
44. Id. at 856. (“The two most helpful cases in establishing membership as the driving force
behind criminal jurisdiction are United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), and Duro v. Reina,
495 U.S. 676 (1990). Wheeler and Duro are grounded in tribal prosecutions for on-reservation
conduct, but nonetheless recognize that tribes possess ‘attributes of sovereignty over both their
members and their territory.’”). See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323 (emphasis added).
45. Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 856 (“Affirming the inherent authority of tribes to try and prosecute
their members, the Court in Duro recognized that the tribes’ ‘criminal jurisdiction over members
is accepted by our precedents and justified by the voluntary character of tribal membership and the
concomitant right of participation in a tribal government, the authority of which rests on
consent.’”). Consent is a complicated concept in Indian Law. For an excellent discussion and
critique of the role ‘consent’ has played in everything from criminal jurisdiction to federal-tribal
relations see Matthew L. M. Fletcher, Tribal Consent, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 45 (2012) [hereinafter
Fletcher, Tribal Consent].
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inherent power of a tribe extends to criminal jurisdiction over their members’
activity that occurs outside of Indian Country.46

B. Extraterritorial Criminal Powers Survive a Divestment
Analysis
While the Sixth Circuit recognized that the inherent power of Indian
tribes includes jurisdiction over the criminal conduct of their members even
outside the reservation, the court did not end its inquiry there. After
Oliphant, the Supreme Court made clear that a tribe’s inherent powers could
nonetheless be divested.47 Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Oliphant
recognized that divestment could be explicit (Congress could expressly take
away a tribe’s inherent power) or it could be implicit (the tribe could attempt
to assert an inherent power inconsistent with a tribe’s status).48
The Sixth Circuit’s opinion quickly dispensed with explicit
divestiture.49 It recognized that Congress has never expressly taken away a
tribe’s inherent power to criminally prosecute its own members.50 The
question of whether the assertion of a tribe’s inherent criminal power outside
of Indian Country, and by necessity into and over land controlled by the
states, had been implicitly divested was more contentious because it required
a return to the first principles of federalism and the relationship between
tribal government and the United States.51
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46. Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 859 (“In sum, Indian tribes possess the inherent sovereign authority
to try and punish members on the basis of tribal membership. Wheeler and Duro may not answer
the specific question of whether tribes are permitted to exercise extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction
over members, but their core principles strongly support the Band’s theory of jurisdiction.”).
47. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding that Indian tribe’s
inherent power to criminally prosecute non-Indians had been implicitly divested, because it was
inconsistent with Indian tribes’ status as “domestic dependent nations”).
48. Id. at 210–12.
49. Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 859 (“Kelsey has not identified any treaty or statute that explicitly
divests the Band of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. Nor has the district court . . . Because no
statute or treaty expressly divests the Band of its inherent authority to try and punish its members
for off-reservation conduct, we turn to the issue of implicit divestiture.”).
50. Id.
51. Our remaining inquiry, then, is whether the tribes have been implicitly divested
of their authority to prosecute members for extra-territorial conduct by virtue of
their domestic dependent status. We look first to the history and breadth of
implicit divestiture, considering whether the Band’s purported jurisdiction is
consistent with the historical underpinnings of the doctrine. We then consider
whether statutes extending federal jurisdiction into Indian Country serve as a
basis for implicitly divesting tribes of their jurisdiction over off-reservation
offenses.
Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 860
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Ultimately, the court determined that a tribe’s inherent criminal
jurisdiction over its members outside of Indian Country was not implicitly
divested. In defining the scope of tribal power that could survive the implicit
divestment analysis, the Sixth Circuit looked to the Supreme Court’s
determination of a tribe’s civil regulatory powers over non-Indians in
Montana v. United States.52 Citing Montana, the court limited the inherent
criminal power of tribes to those cases implicating tribal self-government or
internal relations.53 It proceeded to apply that standard and concluded that
jurisdiction in this case implicated tribal self-government interests because
Kelsey was a member of the Band’s legislative council, the victim was a
tribal employee ‘discharging her official duties’ at a meeting of tribal elders,
and the crime took place at the tribe’s community center which served as the
hub of Tribal community activity.54
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and held that the
Little River Band of Ottawa Indians’ Tribal Court possessed inherent
criminal jurisdiction over the activities of its own members, even outside
Indian Country, whenever jurisdiction was necessary to protect tribal selfgovernment or internal relations.55 The Supreme Court refused to hear
Kelsey’s appeal, establishing the Sixth Circuit’s opinion as the governing
law in the circuit and highly persuasive authority in other jurisdictions.56

III. The Extension of Inherent Criminal Power
The Sixth Circuit does not hear many Indian law cases.57 Perhaps that
is why its opinion in Kelsey v. Pope so easily conflated tribal court civil
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52. Id. at 861 (“Defining the scope of retained inherent sovereignty, Montana held that the
‘exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control
internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive
without express congressional delegation.’”) (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564
(1981)). For a critical discussion of the relationship between tribal government and the United
States, see Wenona T. Singel, The First Federalists, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 775 (2014).
53. Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 861.
54. Id. at 861–62.
55. Id. at 863. (“Because prosecuting Kelsey’s conduct was ‘necessary to protect tribal selfgovernment or control internal relations,’ the Band retained authority to assert criminal jurisdiction
over his off-reservation conduct.”) (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564).
56. Id., cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 183 (2016).
57. The Sixth Circuit decided no Indian law opinions in 2017, largely due to the lack of Indian
tribes in most of the circuit. (There is no reservation land in Ohio, Kentucky, or Tennessee so
virtually all Indian law cases originate from Michigan). For a discussion of the comparative
weights of the Circuit’s Indian law jurisprudence, see Grant Christensen, A View From American
Courts: The Year in Indian Law 2017, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 805 (2018). Despite the relatively
small number of Indian law cases from the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court agrees to review a
fairly large number of Indian law cases arising from Michigan tribes, although some are appeals
from the D.C Circuit. See Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak,
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jurisdictional principles to determine the scope of a tribe’s inherent criminal
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has made clear that the scope of an Indian
tribe’s inherent criminal and civil jurisdiction are different; “[A]lthough
Congress’ decision to extend the criminal jurisdiction of the federal courts
to offenses committed by non-Indians against Indians within Indian Country
supported the holding in Oliphant, there is no comparable legislation
granting the federal courts jurisdiction over civil disputes between Indians
and non-Indians.”58 Professor Matthew Fletcher has perhaps gone furthest
in exploring the different basis for criminal and civil jurisdiction.59 While
criminal jurisdiction has largely been shaped by consent,60 civil jurisdiction
has taken on a larger geographical component, giving tribes inherent control
over the civil conduct of persons regardless of their Indian status.61 The
Kelsey opinion conflates the basis for criminal and civil jurisdiction, which
in turn over limits the inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes that the Sixth
Circuit otherwise recognizes.
Less defensibly, the Sixth Circuit imputed the reasoning from the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding non-members to determine the
proper application of its jurisdiction over the conduct of its own members.
Not only does the Kelsey opinion use the Supreme Court’s discussion of
tribal civil jurisdiction in Montana to establish limits on tribal court criminal
jurisdiction, it also limits the inherent power of tribal courts to their
membership.62 Neither limitation has been approved by Congress, nor
suggested by the Supreme Court as mandated by a tribe’s sovereign status.
The ultimate conclusion that Indian tribes retain inherent criminal
jurisdiction over the conduct of their members when that conduct risks tribal
self-government and internal relations is supportable by the case law, but
such a narrow holding is inconsistent with the inherent power of tribes.63
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567 U.S. 209 (2012); Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014); Patchak v.
Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897 (2018).
58. National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 854 (1985).
59. Fletcher, A Unifying Theory of Tribal Civil Jurisdiction, supra note 2, at 800–01.
60. Id. Consent here is broadly defined. Professor Fletcher notes that early opinions like
Oliphant and Duro limited criminal jurisdiction only to members, but later decisions like United
States v. Lara extend criminal jurisdiction to all Indian persons.
61. Id. at 802–03.
62. Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 849, 860 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[W]hile tribes have not been
implicitly divested of their right to prosecute members, their unique dependent status requires a
more nuanced analysis in determining whether they may extend tribal prosecutions to members’
off-reservation conduct.”) (emphasis added).
63. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (Tribes possess “attributes of
sovereignty over both their members and their territory.”). See also Christensen, supra note 2
(discussing the common law understanding of inherent jurisdictional powers and arguing that tribal
courts ought to have exclusive jurisdiction over conduct occurring on their lands regardless of its
connection to tribal self-government or internal relations).
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The principles of Kelsey ought not to be limited to the exceedingly narrow
set of facts presented to the Sixth Circuit––but instead expanded to recognize
the true extent of a tribe’s inherent criminal powers. Tribes retain criminal
jurisdiction over their members without any inherent geographical
limitations as long as the assertion of that jurisdiction does not impair
significant interests of other sovereigns. Tribes also retain inherent criminal
jurisdiction over all Indians whenever their activities affect a tribe’s member
or its territory.

A. A Tribe Retains Inherent Criminal Power Over Its Members
Without Regard for Geographical Limits

12/07/2018 13:09:16

64. Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 862 (“While certain applications of extra-territorial criminal
jurisdiction might well be incompatible with the tribes’ status as dependent sovereigns—that is,
where they tangentially impact tribal self-governance or fail to implicate core internal relations . . .
the instant exercise of criminal jurisdiction does not fall within that category.”) (citation omitted).
65. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997) (“Montana v. United States, decided
three years later, is the pathmarking case concerning tribal civil authority over nonmembers.”).
66. For a discussion of the role Montana plays in questions of civil jurisdiction, see Fletcher,
A Unifying Theory of Tribal Civil Jurisdiction, supra note 2; Fletcher, Tribal Consent, supra note
45; Douglas Endreson, Reconciling the Sovereignty of Indian Tribes in Civil Matters with the
Montana Line of Cases, 55 VILL. L. REV. 863 (2010); Judith Royster, Montana at the Crossroads,
38 CONN. L. REV. 631 (2006).
67. United States v. Montana, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
68. Kelsey, 809 F.3d at 861 (“[A] free-floating, membership-based jurisdiction over any
criminal conduct could run headlong into Montana’s holding that retained tribal power (i.e.
criminal jurisdiction) is only that which is ‘necessary to protect tribal self-government or control
internal relations.’”) (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564).
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In Kelsey, the Sixth Circuit relied explicitly upon the Supreme Court’s
Montana decision to impute a limitation unto tribes inherent criminal
powers.64 However, Montana is the Court’s ‘pathmaking’65 case on tribal
court civil jurisdiction over non-members.66 The Supreme Court in Montana
expressly contradistinguished the inherent power of tribes to punish tribal
offenders with the limitation that a tribe’s actions must relate to its
governance; “[I]n addition to the power to punish tribal offenders, the Indian
tribes retain their inherent power to . . . [the] exercise of tribal power beyond
what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal
relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes . . . .”67 While
the Kelsey opinion clearly implies that a tribe’s inherent criminal power
extends only when necessary to promote tribal self-governance or internal
relations,68 the Supreme Court has never placed a similar limit on a tribal
court’s criminal jurisdiction.
The Sixth Circuit should not have required the tribe to demonstrate that
the criminal prosecution of Kelsey in tribal court was necessary to protect
tribal self-government because the Supreme Court has only placed that
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limitation on a tribal court’s civil jurisdiction involving non-members. In
United States v. Lara, the Court recognized that Congress had intended that
the mere assertion of criminal jurisdiction by a tribal court over other Indians
on tribal lands is an exercise of self-government, without requiring the
criminal charges to relate to tribal government or a tribe’s internal relations.69
Moreover, the Court expressly endorsed the consent theory of tribal court
criminal jurisdiction over their members:
The retained sovereignty of the tribe is but a recognition of certain
additional authority the tribes maintain over Indians who consent
to be tribal members. Indians like all other citizens share
allegiance to the overriding sovereign, the United States. A tribe’s
additional authority comes from the consent of its members, and
so in the criminal sphere membership marks the bounds of tribal
authority.70
Even though the Duro Court’s holding that tribes lacked inherent
criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians was overturned by
Congress71 and subsequently ratified by the Court,72 the theory of criminal
jurisdiction by consent over tribal members, elucidated by the Supreme
Court, has never been expressly overturned.73 Even after Lara an
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69. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 198 (2004) (“[I]n permitting a tribe to bring certain
tribal prosecutions against nonmember Indians, [it] does not purport to delegate the Federal
Government’s own federal power. Rather, it enlarges the tribes’ own ‘powers of self-government’
to include ‘the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over all Indians,’ including nonmembers.”) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1990)).
70. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990).
71. Act of Nov. 5, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-511, 104 Stat. 1982 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 1301(2)(1990) (“‘[P]owers of self-government’ means and includes all governmental
powers possessed by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative, and judicial, and all offices, bodies, and
tribunals by and through which they are executed, including courts of Indian offenses; and means
the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over all Indians.”) (emphasis added).
72. [S]oon after this Court decided Duro, Congress enacted new legislation
specifically authorizing a tribe to prosecute Indian members of a different tribe.
That new statute, in permitting a tribe to bring certain tribal prosecutions against
nonmember Indians, does not purport to delegate the Federal Government’s own
federal power. Rather, it enlarges the tribes’ own ‘powers of self-government’
to include ‘the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed,
to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians,’ including nonmembers.
Lara, 541 U.S. at 197–98 (2004) (quoting § 1301(2)).
73. Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion emphasizes the enduring role consent
plays in tribal court criminal jurisdiction even after Congress enacted the Duro
fix. “The Constitution is based on a theory of original, and continuing, consent
of the governed. Their consent depends on the understanding that the
Constitution has established the federal structure, which grants the citizen the
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overwhelming majority of the Court recognizes that at a minimum tribes
retain criminal jurisdiction over the conduct of their members.74
Accordingly, while the Sixth Circuit’s holding that the Little Band of
Ottawa Indians had inherent criminal authority over Kelsey’s conduct, the
opinion was too limited. The Band’s inherent power extends to Kelsey’s
conduct wherever his conduct is criminalized by the Band precisely because
he has consented to tribal jurisdiction by virtue of his membership in the
Band.75 This inherent authority is limited only where the assertion of
criminal jurisdiction by the tribe would substantially impede the ability of a
sister sovereign (another tribe or a state) to maintain its own independence.76
While the scope of inherent tribal powers over tribal members may
seem unduly broad, the Court has repeatedly recognized that Indians may be
treated differently because of their status as enrolled members in federallyrecognized Indian tribes.77 Moreover, there is little reason to fear that tribes
will use this extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction irresponsibly. Indeed,
Kelsey is among the first cases to reach the federal appellate courts––
suggesting that tribal courts generally focus their judicial resources in ways
that do not regularly trigger jurisdictional challenges premised on tribal overreach or threaten the competing sovereignty of other states or tribes.
So after reading Lara what is left of the Duro decision? The best
interpretation of Duro asserts that tribal members consent to the inherent
criminal powers of their tribe.78 Normally the tribe will not attempt to extend

protection of two governments, the Nation and the State. Each sovereign must
respect the proper sphere of the other, for the citizen has rights and duties as to
both.
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Id. at 212.
74. Id. (The Lara opinion was a 7-2 decision with only justices Souter and Scalia dissenting).
75. For an excellent discussion of how the Supreme Court has encouraged the development
of consent-based jurisdiction, see Fletcher, Tribal Consent, supra note 66, and Allison M. Dussias,
Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme
Court’s Changing Vision, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1993).
76. Lara, 541 U.S. at 212 ( Kennedy, A., concurring) (“Each sovereign must respect the
proper sphere of the other, for the citizen has rights and duties as to both . . . There is a historical
exception for Indian tribes, but only to the limited extent that a member of a tribe consents to be
subjected to the jurisdiction of his own tribe.”).
77. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (the Bureau of Indian Affairs can hire and
promote Indians within the federal service without violating the due process or equal protection
clauses or triggering strict scrutiny). The Supreme Court in United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S.
641 (1977) found that the Major Crimes Act allows the United States to prosecute certain crimes
committed by Indian persons. The Court held that it was not unconstitutional even though a nonIndian would not have been charged with murder had they committed the exact same offense. The
Court concluded that Congress has singled out Indians for different treatment and the Major Crimes
Act can survive a rational basis review.
78. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990) (“The retained sovereignty of the tribe is but a
recognition of certain additional authority the tribes maintain over Indians who consent to be tribal
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its laws beyond the limits of its territory, regardless of whether that territory
is within a reservation. However, because a tribe’s sovereign status does not
originate from the Constitution79 but stems instead from its inherent powers
as a tribal government, the tribe could decide to extend its criminal laws to
the conduct of its members free from any geographic restraint.

B. A Tribe Retains Inherent Criminal Power Over Non-Member
Indians Whenever Their Conduct Affects Its Members or
Territory
The consent-based theory of tribal criminal jurisdiction does not apply
to non-member Indians (i.e., Indians who are not themselves members of the
tribe).80 However, both Congress and the Court have recognized that the
inherent power of tribal courts extends to all Indians and not just tribal
members.81 The Sixth Circuit in Kelsey made no attempt to delineate this
power—thus leaving unanswered whether the inherent power of tribal courts
extends over non-member Indians for conduct occurring on tribal lands, but
not a part of Indian Country. However, it is not difficult to construct an
answer from the first principles laid out above. A tribe’s inherent criminal
power extends over all non-member Indians whenever that activity touches
upon the tribe or its members.
This conclusion makes sense. Consider a situation where the Indian
status of the perpetrator and victim were the reverse of those found in Kelsey;
a non-member Indian sexually assaulted a member of the Band at the
community center. Since the community center was located on land over
which the tribe has control, United States v. Lara dictates that the tribe’s
inherent criminal jurisdiction permits the tribe to prosecute.82 Clearly, the
40806-hco_46-2 Sheet No. 14 Side B
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members . . . A tribe’s additional authority comes from the consent of its members, and so in the
criminal sphere membership marks the bounds of tribal authority.”).
79. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1962 (2016) (“As separate sovereigns preexisting the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those
constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority.”) (citing
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978)).
80. Obviously non-members have not opted into tribal membership and therefore they are not
said to have ‘consented’ to the criminal jurisdiction of the tribal court. For a discussion of the
origins of consent-based jurisdiction, see Fletcher, A Unifying Theory of Tribal Civil Jurisdiction,
supra note 2 at 800–01; L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the
Millennium, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 813 (1996) (“As full citizens of the United States, the Court
declared, nonmember Indians share the same protections as non-Indians. It then outlined the
contours of what has become the doctrine of consent-based sovereignty. ‘The retained sovereignty
of the tribe is but a recognition of certain additional authority the tribes maintain over Indians who
consent to be tribal members.’”) (quoting Duro, 495 U.S. at 693).
81. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 197–98, 212.
82. Id. at 210. (“[T]he Constitution authorizes Congress to permit tribes, as an exercise of
their inherent tribal authority, to prosecute nonmember Indians.”).
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83. Tribes have had their inherent power to criminally prosecute non-Indians implicitly
divested, because the assertion of that criminal power is inconsistent with their sovereign status.
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210–12 (1978). However United States v. Lara
clearly holds that the courts will defer to Congress when it recognizes that the inherent power of
tribes is broader than those powers previously articulated by the Court. Congress has recently done
so again with the reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)—permitting tribal
criminal jurisdiction over a series of crimes related to domestic violence. See generally Angela
Riley, Crime and Governance in Indian Country, 63 UCLA. L. REV. 1564 (2016). For a discussion
about the interaction between VAWA and Indian tribes before its reauthorization, see Tatum, supra
note 2.
84. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210–12.
85. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 802–03.
86. Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 849, 861 (6th Cir. 2016).
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tribe has a strong interest in the prosecution of this offense; it wants to protect
its members from sexual assault by other Indians and it wants to ensure that
its community center is a safe place for anyone to visit or conduct business.
These interests strongly favor a recognition that a tribe’s inherent criminal
power also extends extraterritorially when it’s necessary to protect a tribe’s
lands or its membership.
It is equally clear that if it was a non-Indian who assaulted a tribal
member at the community center, the inherent criminal power of the tribe
would not permit the non-Indian to be prosecuted unless Congress either
delegated that power to the tribe or recognized that the tribe’s inherent
powers extended to the type of assault described.83 While this seems like a
strange result, the combination of Oliphant with Lara dictate the outcome.
Oliphant established that a tribe’s inherent criminal power does not extend
over non-Indians absent congressional action,84 while Lara held that the
inherent criminal power of a tribe extends to all Indians regardless of whether
they are members.85 To accord this authority; the inherent criminal powers
of a tribal court may extend over all Indian persons, regardless of
membership, for criminal activity occurring on tribal lands. This includes
lands, like the community center in Kelsey v. Pope, that are located outside
of Indian Country, but does not automatically extend to non-Indians.
Congress has recognized the inherent powers of tribal governments “to
exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians,”86 but such recognition comes
with some implied limits related to territoriality. A tribe in California may
not exercise its criminal powers over the conduct of members of a Michigan
tribe while on its Michigan reservation simply because the California tribe
has a tribal court and the members of the Michigan tribe are Indians. Unlike
tribal members, non-member Indians did not consent to the jurisdiction of
the tribe and so they come within its reach only by interacting with its
citizens or threatening the security of its land. The Supreme Court has placed
this limit on the inherent power of tribal courts “Indian tribes are unique
aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members
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and their territory.”87
Extending this language from Mazurie, as
affirmatively applied by the Court in Lara, establishes a natural limitation
on the extent of a tribe’s inherent criminal authority over non-members.

Conclusion

Lara, 541 U.S. at 204 (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)).

12/07/2018 13:09:16

87.
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Tribal courts continue to press the limits of a tribe’s inherent criminal
jurisdiction. Consistent with this movement, the Sixth Circuit was recently
the first federal circuit court to be presented with a case about the expansion
of tribal court criminal jurisdiction outside of Indian Country. While Kelsey
v. Pope established the proposition that the inherent criminal power of tribes
can extend beyond the reservation borders, the Sixth Circuit also confused
the Supreme Court’s criminal and civil jurisprudence, and was overly
cautious when it placed the Montana limits upon a tribal court’s inherent
criminal jurisdiction.
As questions of off-reservation tribal criminal jurisdiction become more
common, Kelsey v. Pope will serve as a starting point from which other
courts diverge. As jurisprudence in this area develops, federal courts should
conclude that there are no artificial limits placed upon the inherent criminal
jurisdiction of a tribe over the conduct of its members. As a condition of
membership, tribal members generally agree to be bound by the tribe’s
criminal rules and to be held accountable in tribal court. Limitations on a
tribe’s criminal powers should be placed upon tribal courts only when: (1)
they attempt to prosecute non-Indians for crimes when Congress has not
recognized the extension of a tribe’s inherent powers; or (2) when they seek
to prosecute non-member Indians for conduct that occurs outside of tribal
lands. Only when non-members have not expressly consented to the
jurisdiction of the tribal court is it reasonable to require that a tribe justify
the assertion of its inherent powers by demonstrating that the non-member’s
conduct has a significant impact on the tribe’s members or territory.

